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CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND NEPA: OVERCOMING THE 
REMOTE AND SPECULATIVE DEFENSE 
ALANA M. WASE∗ 
The sheer number of lawsuits filed annually regarding the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) represents the law’s poten-
tial.  Despite the fact that NEPA’s requirements have been interpreted 
as purely procedural,1 NEPA remains an enormously useful tool for 
environmental protection.  While lawyers continue to sort out NEPA’s 
utility in combating climate change, this Comment will advocate that 
an effective parallel can be drawn between NEPA’s application in the 
nuclear context and NEPA’s application to greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions.  Interpreting NEPA this way ensures optimal application.  
Many of the difficulties in applying NEPA to GHG emissions have al-
ready been encountered and litigated in the nuclear context.  The 
environmental risks posed by nuclear waste and GHG emissions are 
equally difficult to predict with precision, yet both remain extremely 
dangerous.2  Additionally, recent case law provides an instructive focal 
point for further considering the parallel and surmounting a com-
mon pitfall facing petitioners invoking NEPA when alleging inade-
quate climate change analysis.3 
Specifically, in New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,4 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
established a new reference point in the unfolding NEPA case law.  
The court’s holding illuminates a murky area of NEPA, in which envi-
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 1.  See infra Part I.A. 
 2.  See infra Part II.C. 
 3.  See infra Part II.C. 
 4.  681 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  Hereinafter, this Comment will refer to this case as 
New York v. NRC. 
 968 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:967 
ronmental impacts that are “remote or speculative” need not be con-
sidered.  Although the test of what is “remote or speculative” remains 
difficult to define, New York v. NRC at least identifies a scenario that is 
not so uncertain as to preclude consideration in an environmental 
impact statement (“EIS”)—the possibility that a permanent repository 
for spent nuclear fuel may fail to exist in thirty years.5  Although the 
holding pertains most directly to NEPA in the context of nuclear 
power, this Comment will argue that the significance of this decision 
should be broader, as it is applicable to all NEPA challenges including 
those involving climate change impacts. 
This Comment will explain that this case could be a useful tool in 
the ongoing effort to require NEPA analyses to include sound consid-
erations of climate change.6  The jurisprudence on climate change 
consideration in NEPA analyses is still very much in development.  In 
its current form, it is both incomplete and inconsistent.7  Advocates 
seeking more thorough and consistent analysis of climate change im-
pacts in EISs should use this ruling as a rebuttal to the “remote and 
speculative” defense that precludes consideration of climate change 
from NEPA analyses.8  In particular, the decision may be used as 
proof that while the modeling of climate change impacts is not exact, 
agencies are not prevented from including detailed calculations of 
climate change impacts, which are no less uncertain than nuclear 
storage risks. 
Part I will lay out the current state of NEPA litigation regarding 
climate change including a detailed look at the NEPA statute and 
regulations,9 the Council on Environmental Quality’s (“CEQ”) guid-
ance concerning climate change consideration,10 and the current 
state of federal circuit court decisions applying climate change in 
NEPA analyses.11  It will also introduce the New York v. NRC decision.12 
Part II will analyze the state of climate change consideration in 
NEPA, concluding that there is significant room for improvement.  
Next, it will apply the New York v. NRC holding to existing case law 
                                                        
 5.  See infra Part I.D. 
 6.  See infra Part II.C. 
 7.  See infra Part II.B. 
 8.  See infra Part II.C. 
 9.  See infra Part I.A. 
 10.  See infra Part I.B. 
 11.  See infra Part I.C. 
 12.  See infra Part I.D. 
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and argue that the decision could eliminate a barrier in NEPA’s abil-
ity to consider climate change.  Principally, the holding arms courts 
with a new point of comparison on the threshold certainty required 
for considering climate change in an environmental assessment 
(“EA”) or EIS.  This Part will urge application of New York v. NRC to 
preclude agencies from asserting that GHG emissions from a pro-
posed project are too “remote and speculative” as to require consid-
eration in determining the proposal’s environmental impact.  Equally 
important, this Comment will argue that the decision should be used 
to require a more thorough analysis of GHG considerations than the 
cursory review that has become customary in the few proposals includ-
ing GHG impacts in their analyses.  In sum, this Comment will advo-
cate for increased climate change considerations in NEPA and will 
suggest that the New York v. NRC decision offers a new point of per-
suasion as federal circuits are increasingly called upon to address 
when and in what level of detail climate change must be factored into 
NEPA. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The National Environmental Policy Act was signed into law in 
1970.13  The purpose of NEPA is two-fold: (1) to establish a national 
environmental policy,14 and (2) to ensure federal agencies’ adherence 
to the policy in significant decision-making.15  The Act puts in place a 
sweeping national policy, declaring that federal, state, and local gov-
ernments are: 
to use all practicable means and measures, including finan-
cial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to fos-
ter and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in pro-
ductive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other 
                                                        
 13.  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).  It is worth 
noting that President Nixon, a Republican, signed the Act into law, illustrating that envi-
ronmental stewardship was not a partisan issue.  National Environmental Policy Act, COUNCIL 
ON ENVTL. QUALITY, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
 14.  42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006). 
 15.  Id. § 4332. 
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requirements of present and future generations of Ameri-
cans.16 
Despite the Act’s short length, application of NEPA, particularly 
with respect to climate change, is complicated.17  To explain the evo-
lution of the law with respect to climate change considerations, this 
part considers a number of relevant sources.  Part I.A describes the 
NEPA statute and key regulations that provide further detail on agen-
cy compliance with the statute.  Part I.B reviews the Draft NEPA Guid-
ance on Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions (“Draft Guidance”),18 authored by CEQ, the agency in 
charge of administering NEPA.  The Draft Guidance, while the most 
relevant source, is nonetheless limited in its authority.19  Part I.C then 
turns to how the United States courts of appeals have applied NEPA 
to climate change.  Lastly, Part I.D explores the D.C. Circuit’s recent 
holding in New York v. NRC. 
A.  NEPA and Its Corresponding Regulations 
Aside from declaring an aspirational environmental policy,20 the 
substance of NEPA’s legal mandates are rather limited.  The statute 
                                                        
 16.  Id. § 4331(a).  Congress was not shy in its valuation of the environment or man’s 
responsibility for impacting the environment.  In fact, Congress declared a national envi-
ronmental policy in recognition of 
the profound impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of 
the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population 
growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, 
and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the crit-
ical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the over-
all welfare and development of man . . . . 
Id.  
 17.  See infra Part I.C. 
 18.  Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair of the Council on Envtl. Quality, Draft 
NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
(Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Sutley Memorandum], available at http://www.white 
house.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100218-nepa-consideration-effects-ghg-
draft-guidance.pdf. 
 19.  See infra Part II.A. 
 20.  According to NEPA,  states that “it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal 
Government to use all practicable means” to: 
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment 
for succeeding generations; (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, produc-
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requires all federal agencies to prepare an EIS on major federal ac-
tions and proposals for legislation that significantly impact the envi-
ronment.21  In evaluating whether a proposal meets the threshold im-
pact to warrant an EIS, the agency considers the context of the 
proposal as it relates to society, the region, affected interests, and the 
locality.22  The agency also must consider the intensity or severity of 
the impact including: how much the proposed action impacts public 
health, safety, unique characteristics of the area, and the presence of 
endangered or threatened species; precedent set by the proposal; the 
degree to which the possible effects are unknown; whether the action 
may be insignificant individually but significant cumulatively when 
considered with other actions; and whether the action threatens a vio-
lation of other federal, state, or local laws.23  Finally, proposed mitiga-
tion measures may be factored into the decision of whether the pro-
posal would have a significant environmental impact thereby 
necessitating an EIS.24 
                                                        
tive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; (3) attain the widest 
range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health 
or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; (4) preserve im-
portant historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and main-
tain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of 
individual choice; (5) achieve a balance between population and resource use 
which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; 
and (6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum 
attainable recycling of depletable resources. 
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b).  Congress went even further and noted that every person “should en-
joy a healthful environment” and everyone “has a responsibility to contribute to the 
preservation and enhancement of the environment.”  Id. § 4331(c). 
 21.  Id. § 4332(c) (2006). 
 22.  40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a) (2012).  The regulations further clarify, “in the case of a 
site-specific action, significance would usually depend upon the effects in the locale rather 
than in the world as a whole.”  Id. 
 23.  Id. § 1508.27(b). 
 24.  Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act 
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,038 (Mar. 23, 1981).  Where the proposed mitigation 
measures result in the project not attaining the threshold “significant” environmental im-
pact, a “finding of no significant impact” (“FONSI”) is issued; in this case, it is known as a 
“mitigated FONSI.”  40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2012).  Mitigation is defined broadly in the regu-
lations as: avoiding the impact, minimizing impacts, rectifying the impact by repair, reha-
bilitation, or restoration, reducing the impact, or compensating for the impact.  40 C.F.R. 
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If there is doubt as to whether a proposed action will cause signif-
icant environmental impacts as to warrant a complete EIS, agencies 
prepare an EA,25 which can be thought of as a miniature EIS.26  After 
an EA, the federal agency may issue a “finding of no significant im-
pact”27 and dispose of its duty under NEPA or conclude that the envi-
ronmental impact of the proposed action would be significant and 
proceed to complete an EIS.28 
Where an EIS is required because the federal action is likely to 
have significant environmental impacts, it must include: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) 
any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the 
proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-
term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and 
enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irre-
versible and irretrievable commitments of resources which 
would be involved in the proposed action should it be im-
plemented.29 
Further, the subsection (iii) alternatives analysis, which the regula-
tions call “the heart of the environmental impact statement,” must 
contain a rigorous evaluation of reasonable alternatives, including an 
explanation of alternatives that were eliminated from the detailed 
study, an alternative of no action, and mitigation measures not al-
ready in the proposal.30  In evaluating each alternative, the EIS must 
be developed, “providing a clear basis for choice among options by 
the decisionmaker and the public.”31  Ultimately the overall purpose 
                                                        
§ 1508.20 (2012).  As the cost of an EIS is substantial, there are significant economic ad-
vantages to mitigation. 
 25.  40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (2012). 
 26.  40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2011).  The EA is a “concise public document” containing 
“brief discussions of the need for the proposal,” “alternatives as required”, and the “agen-
cies and persons consulted.”  Id. 
 27.  Even a FONSI requires documentation of how the agency arrived at its conclusion.  
40 C.F.R. § 1508.13. 
 28.  40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c)–(e). 
 29.  42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
 30.  40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2012). 
 31.  Id. 
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of NEPA is to ensure that agencies “look before they leap,” encourag-
ing well-informed decision-making.32 
Early NEPA case law has made clear that EIS and EA require-
ments are procedural in nature.  In other words, agencies must follow 
the required steps,33 but they are free to make their own decisions.34  
So long as the agency has performed the EIS or EA and is fully aware 
of the environmental consequences of a proposed action and the al-
ternatives, the agency has satisfied its NEPA burden. 
Despite NEPA’s purely procedural reach, it is a frequently pur-
sued vehicle for environmental protection for a number of reasons.  
First, EISs are highly time consuming, and delay—while theoretically 
only temporary—may ultimately result in abandonment of a pro-
posal.35  Additionally, a completed EIS or EA may be challenged for 
inadequacy, resulting in more delay.  And finally, the EIS, if complet-
ed correctly, requires thorough consideration of all the environmen-
tal impacts of the proposal, making it a useful tool for community 
groups raising awareness among the public and elected officials re-
garding the negative impacts of a project.  For all these reasons, NEPA 
remains prominent law in environmental protection in the United 
States and internationally.36 
                                                        
 32.  The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) hosts a database containing all 
EISs filed since January 2004.  National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA): Environmental Im-
pact Statement (EIS) Database, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ 
nepa/eisdata.html? (last updated June 25, 2012). 
 33.  See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) 
(concluding that while NEPA established “‘significant substantive goals for the Nation,’ 
[it] imposes upon agencies duties that are ‘essentially procedural’” (quoting Vt.. Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978))). 
 34.  Id. at 227–28.  The Court in Strycker went on to state: 
[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural require-
ments, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the 
environmental consequences; it cannot “interject itself within the area of discre-
tion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.” 
Id. (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)). 
 35.  For example after the famous case of Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727 (1972), 
Disney eventually dropped its proposal to lease land in Mineral King Valley to develop a 
ski resort.  Mineral King: Breaking Down the Courthouse Door, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earth 
justice.org/features/mineral-king-breaking-down-the-courthouse-door (last visited Mar. 1, 
2013). 
 36.  See NEPANET, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/nepanet.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 
2012) (listing countries that have adopted NEPA). 
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B.  CEQ Draft Guidance on Considering the Effects of Climate Change 
and GHG Emisions 
On February 18, 2010, Nancy H. Sutley, Chair of CEQ, issued the 
Draft Guidance on how agencies should consider GHG impacts with 
respect to NEPA.37  Although only a draft,38it is the most direct infor-
mation available from CEQ on how federal agencies should analyze 
effects of GHG emissions and climate change when conducting a 
NEPA analysis.39 
The Draft Guidance begins by stating that GHG impacts are rele-
vant to the NEPA analysis.40  Relying on the minimum threshold of 
emissions that must be reported under the Clean Air Act, CEQ sug-
gests that where a proposed action would cause direct annual emis-
sions of 25,000 metric tons or more of CO2-equivalent,
41 “a quantita-
                                                        
 37.  Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18.  The Draft Guidance does not pertain to fed-
eral land and resource management actions but instead solicits comments as to how GHG 
impacts should be considered in federal actions involving federal land and resource man-
agement decisions.  Id. at 2.  The Draft Guidance was promulgated in response to a peti-
tion by the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council, among others.  Int’l 
Ctr. for Tech. Assessment et al., Petition Requesting that the Council on Environmental 
Quality Amend Its Regulations to Clarify that Climate Change Analyses Be Included in En-
vironmental Review Documents (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://209.200.74.155/doc/ 
CEQ%20Petition%20Final%20Version%202-28-08.pdf. 
 38.  See infra text accompanying notes 137–141 for a discussion of the limitations of 
draft guidances. 
 39.  Interestingly, CEQ had mentioned climate change in a previous draft memoran-
dum to agency heads as early as 1997.  It stated, “‘[t]he NEPA process provides an excel-
lent mechanism for consideration of ideas related to global climate change.’”  See Made-
line June Kass, A NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse Gases Into Account in Threshold 
Signficance Determinations, 42 IND. L. REV. 47, 48 n.7 (2009) (quoting Draft Memorandum 
from Kathleen McGinty, Chairman of Council on Envtl. Quality, to all Federal Agency 
NEPA Liaisons (Oct. 8, 1997)).  More formally, in published guidance, CEQ stated, 
“[d]irect effects continue to be most important to decisionmakers, in part because they are 
more certain.  Nonetheless, the importance of . . . climate change, and other cumulative 
effects problems has resulted in many efforts to undertake and improve the analysis of 
cumulative effects.”  COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTS 
UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, at 7 (1997), available at http://ceq. 
hss.doe.gov/nepa/ccenepa/sec1.pdf. 
 40.  Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1. 
 41.  The EPA defines carbon dioxide equivalent as “[a] metric measure used to com-
pare the emissions from various greenhouse gases based upon their global warming poten-
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tive and qualitative assessment may be meaningful to decision makers 
and the public.”42  Where direct annual emissions fall below this 
amount, CEQ leaves it up to federal agencies to determine whether 
the proposed action’s long-term emissions necessitate consideration.43  
The CEQ is careful to state that the 25,000 metric tons is not “a 
threshold of significant effects,” but instead “an indicator of a mini-
mum level of GHG emissions that may warrant some description in 
the appropriate NEPA analysis.”44 
While endorsing GHG consideration in NEPA analyses, CEQ 
states that GHGs are a global problem resulting from many sources, 
each causing “relatively small addition[s],” and thus federal agencies’ 
EISs and EAs should “reflect this global context and be realistic in fo-
cusing on ensuring that useful information is provided.”45  The Draft 
Guidance offers a list of proposals that may warrant GHG impact con-
sideration: large, solid-waste landfills, energy facilities such as coal-
fired power plants, or methane venting in coal mines.46  The Draft 
Guidance also suggests that projects designed for long-term use and 
located in areas vulnerable to experiencing the effects of climate 
change warrant climate change consideration, particularly with re-
spect to adaptation potential.47  In other words, the agencies should 
consider these projects’ capacity to adapt to a changing climate. 
Once it is determined that GHG emissions merit explicit analysis, 
CEQ suggests that agencies set spatial and temporal limits to their 
GHG consideration and “focus on aspects of climate change that may 
lead to changes in the impacts, sustainability, vulnerability and design 
of the proposed action.”48  Where the direct emissions of the project 
necessitate an EIS, an agency should: “(1) quantify cumulative emis-
sions over the life of the project; (2) discuss measures to reduce GHG 
emissions, including consideration of reasonable alternatives; and (3) 
                                                        
tial (GWP).”  Glossary of Climate Change Terms: Carbon Dioxide Equivalent, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary.html (last updated June 14, 2012). 
 42.  Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1. 
 43.  Id. at 1–2. 
 44.  Id. at 2.  This qualification creates a pregnant negative.  Stating that only direct 
emissions greater than 25,000 CO2-equivalent “may warrant some description” in a NEPA 
analysis implies that projects without such emissions warrant no discussion of GHG im-
pacts in their NEPA analysis.  Id. at 1–2.  This is discussed further in Part II. 
 45.  Id. at 2. 
 46.  Id. at 3. 
 47.  Id. at 7. 
 48.  Id. at 2. 
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qualitatively discuss the link between such GHG emissions and climate 
change.”49  Amongst this general guidance, CEQ warns that “agencies 
should recognize the scientific limits of their ability to accurately pre-
dict climate change effects, especially of a short-term nature, and not 
devote effort to analyzing wholly speculative effects.”50 
In evaluating alternatives to a proposal, CEQ suggests comparing 
energy use and mitigation opportunities associated with each alterna-
tive.51  Additionally, each alternative should be compared for compli-
ance with federal, state, or local goals for energy conservation.52  The 
CEQ asserts that NEPA’s consideration of GHGs and alternative pro-
posals can result in agencies reducing vulnerability to climate change 
through adaptation and mitigating GHG impacts.53 
Finally, CEQ notes that NEPA analysis of climate change is likely 
to evolve both in regard to the scientific information available as well 
as to the law and policy in this arena.54  Thus, it concludes that even 
once the Draft Guidance is issued in final form it is subject to change 
as developments in science, law, and policy occur.55  In summary, alt-
hough the subject matter of the Draft Guidance is perfectly germane, 
its substance is limited.56 
C.  NEPA and Climate Change Case Law in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals 
Litigation invoking NEPA is abundant and represents one tool in 
the litigator’s limited toolbox to reduce GHG emissions.  Interesting-
ly, a recent survey found that one-sixth of all climate change litigation 
is brought through NEPA challenges.57  The abundance of suits repre-
sents environmental advocates’ hope NEPA will elevate climate 
change consideration in agency decisionmaking and prevent new pro-
                                                        
 49.  Id. at 3.  In calculating direct emissions, the agency should only consider what is 
emitted as a result of the agency’s control or authority.  Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 
541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004).  
 50. Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2. 
 51.  Id. at 5. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 2. 
 54.  Id. at 11. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See infra Part II.A. 
 57.  David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Emperical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A 
New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 57–58 (2012). 
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jects with significant GHG implications.  As case law reveals, however, 
there is significant ambiguity in terms of what is required of federal 
agencies under NEPA with respect to climate change.  This Part re-
views the limited the few cases that have addressed this issue. 
As NEPA has been interpreted to be largely procedural, lawyers 
litigating NEPA and climate change may bring a limited number of 
challenges.  Two of the main challenges are: (1) a challenge to an EA 
or an EIS for inadequate analysis of the climate impacts of the pro-
posed project,58 or (2) a challenge to an EA or EIS for inadequate 
analysis of alternatives to a project and their respective climate change 
impacts.59 
Despite the abundance of NEPA climate change litigation, only 
two circuits, the Ninth Circuit60 and the Eighth Circuit,61 have ruled 
on NEPA’s requirement of climate change consideration.  Although 
circuit courts have found that climate change impacts are appropriate 
considerations under NEPA, they have set the bar at two very different 
levels: Specifically, the courts differ in terms of their acceptance of the 
remote and speculative defense and vary as to the degree of detail re-
quired in analyzing GHG impacts. 
1.  The Ninth Circuit’s Searching Standard 
The Ninth Circuit is the leader in setting a high bar for climate 
change considerations under NEPA.  In Center for Biological Diversity v. 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,62 the court famously held 
that “[t]he impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is 
precisely the kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires 
                                                        
 58.  See, e.g., Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125, 1131 
(9th Cir. 2006) (challenging the adequacy of the Final Supplemental EIS for deepening a 
channel of the Columbia River). 
 59.  See, e.g., Mayo Found. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 472 F.3d 545, 548–49, 554 (8th Cir. 
2006) (challenging the adequacy of the Final Supplemental EIS for failing to consider the 
GHG impacts of constructing a new rail line for coal delivery as well as alternatives to the 
project and their respective emission impacts). 
 60.  See infra Part I.C.1. 
 61.  See infra Part I.C.2. 
 62.  508 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that it was improper to remand and imme-
diately require an EIS, rather the agency could determine whether to do a revised EA or a 
complete EIS, yet nonetheless affirming that the original EA was inadequate), vacated and 
superseded on denial of reh’g by 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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agencies to conduct.”63  At issue in the case was the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration’s (“NHTSA”) Final Rule setting corpo-
rate average fuel economy (“CAFE”) standards for light trucks for 
Model Years (“MY”) 2008–2011.64  In the Final Rule, NHTSA adopted 
new fuel standards for light trucks, requiring an average of 22.5 miles 
per gallon (“mpg”) for MY 2008, 23.1 mpg for MY 2009, and 23.5 mpg 
for MY 2010.65  Petitioners challenged NHTSA’s EA and subsequent 
FONSI, in addition to challenging the rule as arbitrary and capri-
cious.66 
The court resoundingly agreed with petitioners’ interpretation of 
NEPA requirements.  The court reasoned that although the Final 
Rule would result in a .02% decrease in emissions, this did not mean 
that the environmental impacts of the rule were insignificant.67  Ra-
ther, the court stated that the proposed CAFE standards would not 
reduce carbon emissions but only decrease the rate of growth.68  Fur-
thermore, the court found the EA’s cumulative impacts analysis inad-
equate, as “it [did] not evaluate the ‘incremental impact’ that these 
emissions [would] have on climate change or on the environment.”69 
Additionally, the court stated, “the fact that ‘climate change is 
largely a global phenomenon that includes actions that are outside of 
[the agency’s] control . . . does not release the agency from the duty 
of assessing the effects of its actions on global warming.’”70  The court 
even stated that while an individual proposed action might have an 
“‘individually minor’ effect on the environment,” such as the .02% de-
lay in emissions, the CAFE standards are “‘collectively significant ac-
tions taking place over a period of time.’”71  In line with this idea, the 
court quoted the dissent of Chief Judge Wald72 in City of Los Angeles v. 
                                                        
 63.  Id. at 550. 
 64.  Id. at 513.  Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, NHTSA is 
charged with setting a performance standard of a minimum level of average fuel economy 
applicable to vehicle manufacturers.  49 U.S.C. §§ 32901–32919 (2006). 
 65.  Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 508 F.3d at 519, 523. 
 66.  Id. at 513–14. 
 67.  Id. at 556. 
 68.  Id. at 549. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 550 (alterations in original). 
 71.  Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2007)). 
 72.  Id. 
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,73 the first case to hold 
that climate change considerations were not required under NEPA.74  
Chief Judge Wald, ahead of her time, stated: “[W]e cannot afford to 
ignore even modest contributions to global warming.  If global warm-
ing is the result of the cumulative contributions of myriad sources, 
any one modest in itself, is there not a danger of losing the forest by 
closing our eyes to the felling of the individual trees?”75  Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit set a high precedent for GHG considerations required 
under NEPA and did not allow an agency to skirt this responsibility 
despite the cumulative nature of climate change. 
2.  The Eighth Circuit’s Deferential Approach 
Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit, while also reaching the conclu-
sion that GHG emissions are appropriate considerations under NEPA, 
implied a less searching standard.  In Mid States Coalition for Progress v. 
Surface Transportation Board,76 the Eighth Circuit reviewed a $1.4 bil-
lion proposal, which the Surface Transportation Board had approved 
and dubbed the “largest and most challenging rail construction pro-
posal” ever before the Board.77  The project involved 280 miles of new 
rail construction and 600 miles of rail upgrades, the purpose of which 
was to transport coal from mines to power plants more quickly and at 
less cost.78  Although a 5,000-page draft EIS was prepared,79 the Eighth 
Circuit held that the EIS was inadequate as it failed to consider in-
creased emissions that could have resulted from the project.80 
The court described how the price of coal would impact its de-
mand: 
                                                        
 73.  912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. 
Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
 74.  See id. at 481–83 (dismissing on the merits the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil’s petition that the National Transit Highway Administration was required to prepare 
“an EIS in order to consider the adverse climatic effects of the increase in fossil fuel con-
sumption that would result from setting a CAFE standard lower than 27.5 mpg”). 
 75.  Id. at 501 (Wald, C.J., dissenting). 
 76.  345 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 77.  Id. at 532, 550. 
 78.  Id. at 532–33. 
 79.  Id. at 533. 
 80.  Id. at 550.  A number of emissions were of concern from the project, including 
nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide, particulates, and mercury.  Id. at 548. 
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[T]he proposition that the demand for coal will be unaffect-
ed by an increase in availability and a decrease in price, 
which is the stated goal of the project, is illogical at best.  
The increased availability of inexpensive coal will at the very 
least make coal a more attractive option to future entrants 
into the utilities market when compared with other potential 
fuel sources, such as nuclear power, solar power, or natural 
gas.  Even if this project will not affect the short-term de-
mand for coal, which is possible since most existing utilities 
are single-source dependent, it will most assuredly affect the 
nation’s long-term demand for coal . . . .81 
The court firmly rejected the project’s proponents’ position that the 
effects of increased coal generation did not have to be addressed be-
cause coal-hauling contracts had not been finalized and therefore, the 
effects were too speculative.82  Instead the court held that the “nature 
of the effect . . . is far from speculative”; it is only the extent of the ef-
fect that is speculative and, as such, it must be evaluated under 
NEPA.83  Thus, the court initially set a high standard for NEPA con-
sideration of GHG emissions. 
Nonetheless, after remand and a supplemental EIS, the court’s 
searching standard morphed into deference.  After the Surface 
Transportation Board approved the rail line, the Sierra Club peti-
tioned the Eighth Circuit for review.84  The court rejected the petition 
for review, finding the supplemental EIS sufficient.85  While the Board 
had used modeling and found that “on both national and regional 
levels, projected air emissions for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, car-
bon dioxide, and mercury associated with the small increase of addi-
tional coal usage would be less than 1%,” it was unable to determine 
the environmental impacts at the local level.86  Perhaps most telling, 
the Eighth Circuit approved of the Board’s conclusion that the local 
                                                        
 81.  Id. at 549. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Mayo Found. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 472 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 85.  Id. at 556. 
 86.  Id. at 555 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As a point of 
comparison, the Ninth Circuit’s held that only a .02% decrease in emissions was significant 
enough as to preclude a FONSI.  See supra text accompanying note 67. 
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impacts were “‘speculative’” and “‘ultimately unforeseeable,’” and it 
was thus unnecessary to require increased mitigation.87 
To date, only two federal courts of appeals have dealt with cli-
mate change consideration under NEPA.  While they have facially 
reached the same result that climate change impacts are appropriate 
considerations in an EA and EIS,88 the courts in practice have de-
manded two significantly different standards of review and two differ-
ent interpretations of what level of emissions impacts are speculative 
or significant. 
D.  New York v. NRC 
In contrasting how the federal circuit courts have dealt with the 
remote and speculative defense in regard to GHG emissions, it is 
worthwhile to consider how the defense is treated generally under 
NEPA.  New York v. NRC offers one point of comparison.  In that case, 
four states—New York, New Jersey, Vermont, and Connecticut—the 
Prairie Island Indian Community, and environmental groups peti-
tioned the D.C. Circuit to review a Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(“NRC” or “Commission”) rulemaking, which petitioners alleged was 
in violation of NEPA.89  Specifically, petitioners challenged a 2010 up-
date to the agency’s Commission’s Waste Confidence Decision 
(“WCD”), which serves as the basis for its policy on the storage and 
disposal of nuclear waste.90 
                                                        
 87.  Mayo Found., 472 F.3d at 556 (quoting Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. Constr. Into 
the Powder River Basin, STB Finance Docket No. 33407 at 17 (Feb. 15, 2006)) [hereinafter 
STB 2006 Decision].  The Board maintained that in order for the effects not to be specula-
tive, it “‘would need to know not only what existing or new power plants would actually use 
DM&E’s service, but also whether they would otherwise not burn PRB coal, not burn as 
much coal, or burn a different mix of coal.’”  Id. at 555–56 (quoting STB 2006 Decision at 
13). 
 88.  Furthermore, it is likely that future courts will also conclude that climate change 
impacts are appropriate considerations under NEPA, especially after Massachusetts v. EPA 
and the Supreme Court’s recognition that EPA may regulate GHG emissions as a signifi-
cant environmental problem.  549 U.S. 497, 521–26 (2007). 
 89.  New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 473 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 90.  Id. at 475.  The original WCD was published in 1984 as a result of Minnesota v. 
NRC, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979), in which the D.C. Circuit remanded an NRC decision 
to allow the expansion of spent-fuel pools at two nuclear plants.  New York, 681 F.3d. at 
474–75. 
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In the original WCD, the Commission made five “Waste Confi-
dence Findings”: (1) spent nuclear fuel (“SNF”) may be safely dis-
posed of in a mined geologic repository; (2) by 2007–2009, such a re-
pository will exist; (3) until the repository is available, waste will be 
safely managed in the interim; (4) SNF may be safely stored at nuclear 
plants thirty years or more after the licensed life of each plant; and 
(5) if needed, safe, independent storage will become available.91  The 
Commission revised the WCD in 199092 and reviewed it without altera-
tion in 1999.93 
In its 2010 revision, the Commission reaffirmed three of the orig-
inal findings and altered findings number two and four.94  Finding 
number two, which had previously concluded that a permanent geo-
logic repository would be available in the first quarter of the twenty-
first century, now states that a repository will be available “when nec-
essary,” removing any reference to a specific date.95  Finding number 
four also was revised so that SNF, which previously could be stored on 
site for thirty years beyond the licensed life of a plant, now may be 
stored for sixty years.96  After the revisions, the Commission adopted a 
new Temporary Storage Rule (“TSR”), bringing the Commission’s 
regulations into conformance with the WCD revisions.97  Petitioners 
challenged these revisions and the new TSR in New York v. NRC.98 
Petitioners brought suit alleging that the WCD is a major federal 
action and that the Commission did not perform an EIS as required 
by NEPA.99  Specifically, petitioners argued that the Commission vio-
lated NEPA because its conclusion that permanent storage will be 
available “when necessary”: (1) failed to take into consideration the 
                                                        
 91.  Waste Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,658, 34,659–60 (Aug. 31, 1984). 
 92.  See Waste Confidence Decision Review, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,472, 38,474, 38,505 (Sept. 
18, 1990) (updating the WCD due to new understandings on waste disposal and changing 
the date that a repository would be available to store spent fuel to 2025). 
 93.  Waste Confidence Decision Review: Status, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,005, 68,006–07 (Dec. 6, 
1999). 
 94.  Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,037, 81,037 (Dec. 23, 2010). 
 95.  New York, 681 F.3d at 475. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Consideration of Environmental Impacts of Temporary Storage of Spent Fuel Af-
ter Cessation of Reactor Operation, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,032, 81,032 (Dec. 23, 2010); 10 C.F.R. 
§ 51.23(a) (2012). 
 98.  New York, 681 F.3d at 475. 
 99.  Id. at 474, 476. 
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societal and political barriers that have prevented a permanent repos-
itory from being constructed thus far; (2) provided no meaningful 
definition of the term “necessary;” and (3) failed to consider the pos-
sibility that a permanent repository may never be built and the envi-
ronmental impacts of such an outcome.100  Additionally, petitioners 
contested the Commission’s FONSI regarding prolonged temporary 
storage of SNF at nuclear sites for sixty years beyond a plant’s li-
cense.101  Petitioners also faulted the analysis because there was no in-
vestigation into the impacts of pool fires, the likelihood of which, alt-
hough low, is not so low as to be “remote or speculative.”102 
The D.C. Circuit granted the petition for review and vacated the 
Commission’s WCD changes and the TSR.103  Specifically, the court 
held that the Commission’s rulemaking was a major federal action, 
subjecting it to NEPA.104  Additionally, the court determined that the 
Commission’s analysis of the risks posed by SNF was inadequate be-
cause (1) the analysis ignored the possibility that a permanent storage 
repository may not exist; and (2) the Commission failed to analyze the 
“future dangers and key consequences” of allowing SNF to be stored 
on site at a nuclear plant for sixty years beyond the expiration of the 
plant’s license.105 
In regard to the court’s conclusion that the WCD rulemaking was 
a major federal action, the court reasoned that “NEPA requires that 
‘environmental issues be considered at every important stage in the 
decision making process concerning a particular action’” and that the 
WCD is such a “stage” due to the preclusive effect the WCD findings 
have on future licensing decisions.106  The court noted that while it 
                                                        
 100.  Id. at 477. 
 101.  Petitioners alleged that the FONSI was inadequate because the Commission did 
not review the risks with respect to each plant and its unique characteristics.  Id. at 479.  
Petitioners further stated that even if the Commission’s generic EA of extending tempo-
rary storage of SNF from thirty to sixty years was appropriate, it was nonetheless insuffi-
cient because the Commission looked at past leaks only and did not consider the risks of 
other future leaks.  Id. at 479–80. 
 102.  Id. at 480.  Petitioners also asserted that the Commission violated NEPA because it 
did not investigate non-health environmental impacts from allowing SNF to be stored sixty 
years at nuclear sites.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 483. 
 104.  Id. at 476. 
 105.  Id. at 473. 
 106.  Id. at 476 (quoting Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy 
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
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gives considerable deference to an agency’s decision to complete an 
EA versus an EIS,107 if an agency chooses to prepare an EA only, 
the agency must 1) “accurately identif[y] the relevant envi-
ronmental concern,” 2) take a “hard look at the problem in 
preparing its EA,” 3) make a “convincing case for its finding 
of no significant impact,” and 4) show that even if a signifi-
cant impact will occur, “changes or safeguards in the project 
sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.”108 
The court then reviewed the Commission’s change to WCD find-
ing number two—that a permanent repository would be available 
“when necessary.”  The court found the Commission’s analysis defi-
cient, as the Commission “did not examine the environmental effects 
of failing to establish a repository.”109  The court noted that, under 
NEPA, such an analysis would be unnecessary if the probability of 
Failure to build a repository is “so low as to be ‘remote and specula-
tive,’ or if the combination of probability and harm is sufficiently min-
imal.”110  According to the court, however, current uncertainty regard-
ing whether a repository will be built places it beyond the “too remote 
and speculative” threshold.111  Indeed, the possibility of a permanent 
repository not being built is a “far cry” from “remote and speculative,” 
and “[t]he Commission can and must assess the potential environ-
mental effects of [a failure to establish a repository].”112 
Finally, the court reviewed the Commission’s alterations to the 
WCD finding that SNF may be safely stored at a nuclear plant for sixty 
years after the plant’s licensed life.113  The court again held that the 
Commission’s EA and resulting FONSI were inadequate—this time 
because the analysis was not forward-looking and only considered the 
                                                        
 107.  Id. at 477. 
 108.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos v. Nor-
ton, 433 F.3d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 109.  Id. at 478. 
 110.  Id. at 478–79. 
 111.  See id. at 478 (“[T]he EA is insufficient because a finding that ‘reasonable assur-
ance exists that sufficient mined geologic repository capacity will be available when neces-
sary,’ does not describe a probability of failure so low as to dismiss the potential conse-
quences of such a failure.” (internal citation omitted)); see also id. at 479 (“Here, a 
‘reasonable assurance’ that permanent storage will be available is a far cry from finding the 
likelihood of nonavailability to be ‘remote and speculative.’”). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
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risks of future leaks similar to those that have already occurred.114  
The court also held that the analysis was insufficient for its failure to 
investigate both the consequences of pool fires as well as the probabil-
ity of such fires occurring; according to the court, the possibility of a 
pool fire is not so “remote and speculative” as to preclude an analysis 
of its consequences.115  While the court faulted NRC’s analysis for a va-
riety of reasons, it rejected the petitioners’ argument that the analysis 
had to review each plant and its risks individually.116  The court never-
theless found the analysis so flawed as not to merit the court’s defer-
ence.117 
In summary, the court held that the Commission’s WCD findings 
constituted a federal action subject to NEPA, and the Commission’s 
EA was insufficient as it did not adequately evaluate the environmen-
tal risks of NRC’s decisions.118  While the court did not find it neces-
sary for the analysis concerning the impacts of storing SNF for sixty 
years to be site-specific, it nonetheless avowed that the analysis must 
be substantially forward-looking and, unless the probability of a risk is 
“effectively zero,” the reviewing agency must “account for the conse-
quences of each risk.”119 
II.  ANALYSIS 
One can hardly doubt from the number of NEPA challenges 
brought annually, and the frequency with which the challenges in-
volve climate change, that environmentalists believe NEPA is a viable 
method to tackle climate change.  Unfortunately, the state of the CEQ 
regulations120 and the holdings thus far by the federal courts of ap-
peals suggest that NEPA’s review of climate change impacts—
                                                        
 114.  Id. at 481.  The court disapproved of NRC’s reasoning that, because past leaks 
from spent fuel have caused little harm, extending storage of SNF for an additional thirty 
years will also cause no significant impacts.  Id.  Instead, the court stated that “a proper 
analysis of the risks would necessarily look forward to examine the effects of the additional 
time in storage, as well as examin[e] past leaks.”  Id.  More specifically, the court stated 
that just because past leaks have not been harmful does not address whether and how fu-
ture leaks might occur and their potential impacts.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 481–82. 
 116.  Id. at 480. 
 117.  Id. at 481. 
 118.  Id. at 473. 
 119.  Id. at 483. 
 120.  See infra Part II.A. 
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including when such impacts must be considered in an EA or EIS, the 
detail necessary in the analysis, and therefore NEPA’s effectiveness in 
abating emissions—is still very much undetermined.121  Parts II.A and 
II.B analyze each source of authority on the matter and find that the 
climate change considerations required by the courts and the execu-
tive branch to satisfy NEPA, thus far have been cursory.  In Part II.C, 
the Comment turns to the New York v. NRC ruling to argue that it has 
the capacity to raise the bar of climate change analysis under NEPA. 
A.  CEQ Draft Guidence Leaves Much to Be Desired: Both Substantively 
and Procedurally 
Although one would expect the agency in charge of issuing guid-
ance and regulations on NEPA to provide a definitive answer as to the 
role of climate change considerations in an EIS or EA, CEQ’s Draft 
Guidance provides little assistance on the matter.  This is the case 
both substantively and procedurally. 
The substance of the Draft Guidance does not provide much di-
rection as it leaves the bulk of instances in which climate change 
could be considered up to individual agencies.122  For example, re-
garding cumulative GHG emissions of a proposal, CEQ sets no 
threshold amount at which cumulative emissions trigger considera-
tion in an EIS or EA; instead, CEQ allows each individual agency to 
make its own determination of when cumulative GHG emissions must 
be addressed under NEPA.123  This is in contrast to CEQ’s direction 
that proposals with direct annual emissions of more than 25,000 met-
ric tons “may warrant some description in the appropriate NEPA analy-
sis.”124  Thus, even where annual emissions exceed 25,000 metric tons, 
there is still room to avoid calculating climate change impacts or to 
provide only minimal review.125  Further encouraging marginalization 
of climate change impacts, the Draft Guidance reminds agencies that 
climate change is a global problem, so agencies should be “realistic” 
                                                        
 121.  See infra Part II.B. 
 122.  See supra Part I.B. 
 123.  See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 124.  Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 125.  See Jeff Thaler, Greenhouse Gas Litigation and NEPA: A Split in the Courts, 5 ABA 
TRENDS 12, 12–13 (2012) (arguing that climate change consideration required under 
NEPA will remain in flux and increasingly divergent unless the Supreme Court rules on 
the matter or unless Congress acts comprehensively to regulate emissions). 
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to ensure the information provided is useful.126  This statement rein-
forces under-inclusion of information.127  The CEQ also notes that 
“agencies should recognize the scientific limits of their ability to accu-
rately predict climate change effects . . . and not devote effort to ana-
lyzing wholly speculative effects,”128 as if advancing climate change 
considerations in NEPA analysis but in the same breath retracting it.  
This sentence in particular gives significant fodder for the affirmative 
“remote and speculative” defense agencies may raise to preclude cli-
mate change impacts from an EIS or EA.129  In other words, defend-
ants could point to this language as proof that even CEQ recognizes 
climate change impacts as “remote and speculative,” rendering moot 
a challenge to an EIS or EA as inadequate for failure to consider GHG 
impacts. 
Where agencies have resolved to consider climate change ramifi-
cations of a proposal—because annual emissions are over 25,000 met-
ric tons130 or the agencies have done so on its own accord—CEQ di-
rects agencies to discuss possibilities to reduce GHG emissions.131  Un-
Unfortunately, CEQ then provides a very limited set of examples that 
may warrant a discussion of GHG impacts and opportunities for miti-
                                                        
 126.  Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2. 
 127.  Professor Madeline June Kass reached a similar conclusion about the previous 
guidelines.  See Kass, supra note 39, at 58–67 (stating that “the lead agency need not evalu-
ate (or closely evaluate) climate related impacts—and may even deem it inappropriate to 
do so”). 
 128.  Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2. 
 129.  Giving CEQ the benefit of the doubt, it does not appear that its prescription 
against analyzing “wholly speculative effects” of climate change was done intentionally to 
prohibit climate change consideration in NEPA analyses altogether.  Rather, it appears its 
prescription was meant to limit how much information should be included in such an 
analysis.  See id. (directing agencies to focus on “significant source[s] of GHGs” but warn-
ing them not to focus on “wholly speculative efforts”).  Nonetheless, it would not take 
much lawyering to use CEQ’s own language to argue that climate impacts are not only not 
required, but are discouraged. 
 130.  See id. at 1 (establishing the threshold limit).  One benefit to specifying a thresh-
old of direct emissions triggering an EIS is the pressure this creates on projects that would 
normally be over 25,000 metric tons to incorporate mitigation measures to go below the 
threshold and avoid an EIS.  For an interesting discussion of how NEPA could be used to 
“tip the balance in favor of this form of voluntary mitigation,” see Amy L. Stein, Climate 
Change Under NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration of Greenhouse Gases, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 
473, 538 (2010). 
 131.  Sutley Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2. 
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gation: “approval of a large solid waste landfill; approval of energy fa-
cilities such as a coal-fired power plant; or authorization of a methane 
venting coal mine.”132  Although CEQ does not specify that the list is 
exhaustive, the nature of these examples further suggests that GHG 
emissions are only required in an EIS or EA for projects with the most 
direct emissions impacts.133  Thus, ultimately, agencies receive no 
more direction substantively than they had previously,134 or perhaps 
less optimistic, the Draft Guidance suggests that an analysis of climate 
change impacts has a limited role in an EIS or EA and is only re-
quired in the most obvious of projects.135 
Procedurally, the Draft Guidance also fails to provide concrete 
authority.  First issued in February 2010, the Draft Guidance remains 
merely a guideline and a draft guideline at that.136  Per the Supreme 
Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,137 agency interpretations, includ-
ing guidance documents, are “entitled to consideration . . . .  But . . . 
courts properly may accord less weight to such guidelines than to ad-
ministrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the 
force of law . . . .”138  The amount of deference, Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co.139 instructs, “depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in [the 
guidance documents] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those fac-
tors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”140  
Thus, the draft nature of the guidelines, along with the fact that the 
                                                        
 132.  Id. at 3. 
 133.  Each of these examples would likely cause significant GHG emissions.  Had CEQ 
listed projects with less obvious GHG emissions impacts, such as building a new federal 
building, approving a permit for a new airport, or building a new highway, it would have 
suggested that GHG impacts should be considered more broadly. 
 134.  Previous CEQ guidance on the role of climate change impacts in an EIS or EA was 
extremely limited and was couched in a memorandum addressing how cumulative impacts 
should be analyzed under NEPA.  See supra note 39. 
 135.  See supra notes 124–128, 132–133 and accompanying text. 
 136.  It should be noted that the earlier guidance issued by CEQ also shared this prob-
lem.  See supra note 39. 
 137.  429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
 138.  Id. at 141 (citation omitted). 
 139.  323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 140.  Id. at 140. 
 2013] CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND NEPA 989 
Draft Guidance explicitly states that it is subject to change,141 suggest 
that the Draft Guidance is not likely to persuade. 
In conclusion, the Draft Guidance is not of much consequence, 
and it fails to give NEPA a meaningful role in combating climate 
change.142  Specifically, rather than affirmatively state that climate 
change is neither “remote” nor “speculative,” which would bar an af-
firmative defense in NEPA challenges, CEQ makes contradictory 
statements.  In one paragraph, CEQ states that climate change should 
be considered in EISs and EAs, and then in the next, it limits such 
analysis to only the most direct sources of emissions and to a re-
strained discussion of such impacts.143 
B.  Not Surprisingly, the Courts Are Equally Conflicted in Assessing the 
Adequacy of Climate Change Analysis 
In 2011, there were forty-eight federal courts of appeals opinions 
on NEPA litigation.144  Interestingly, none of them dealt with climate 
change; it is only a matter of time, however, until additional circuits 
tackle the issue.145  While it appears likely, especially after the Su-
preme Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA decision, that GHG emissions will 
be held appropriate considerations under NEPA,146 the standard of 
review is likely to vary.147  Specifically, in determining the adequacy of 
                                                        
 141.  See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 142.  See James R. Holcomb, IV, NEPA and Climate Change: After the CEQ’s Draft Guidance, 
41 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 259, 268 (2011) (concluding similarly that the CEQ guidelines are 
largely a failure due to their inability to provide substantive guidance on when and how to 
analyze GHG and climate change effects). 
 143.  See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.  But see notes 123–130 and accom-
panying text. 
 144.  Environmental Impact Assessment 2011 Annual Report, 2011 ABA ENV’T ENERGY, & 
RESOURCES L.: YEAR IN REV. 347, 347 (2011).  The Ninth Circuit decided twenty-five of the 
forty-eight decisions.  Id. 
 145.  As one-sixth of climate change litigation is filed under NEPA, Markell & Ruhl, su-
pra note 57, at 57, it is only a matter of time before additional courts of appeals must deal 
with the matter. 
 146.  It is highly likely as Massachusetts v. EPA recognized the magnitude of the envi-
ronmental problems caused by GHG emissions and held that EPA has authority to regu-
late GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act.  549 U.S. 497, 521–26, 528 (2007). 
 147.  For example, will the standard of review be the searching standard the Ninth Cir-
cuit has imposed or will it be more deferential like the Eighth Circuit’s standard?  See supra 
Part I.C. 
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the emissions analysis in EISs and EAs, courts will vary significantly, as 
illustrated by Center for Biological Diversity and Mayo.148 
While the cases are not perfectly analogous—one dealt proactive-
ly with CAFE standards meant to conserve energy resources while the 
other dealt with the construction of a railway to deliver coal more 
quickly and cheaply to power plants—some observations can be 
drawn.149  It appears that the Ninth Circuit will conduct a thorough 
review, scrutinizing the adequacy of EISs and EAs for their analysis of 
GHG emissions among other environmental impacts.150  Despite the 
fact that the CAFE standards at issue in Center for Biological Diversity 
would have led to a reduction in carbon emissions, the Ninth Circuit 
still found the NEPA review inadequate as the agency did not consid-
er making further reductions.151  In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Mayo 
held that the NEPA review of environmental impacts, including cli-
mate change, was adequate where the project would result in an in-
crease in emissions and where the air emission impacts were not de-
termined at a local level.152  The court held that the NEPA analysis, 
which concluded that the project would increase emissions regionally 
and nationally by only one percent, was sufficient.153  Yet, it is not sur-
prising that the national emissions impacts would be less than one 
percent, for there are many sources of GHG emissions.154  Had the 
Eighth Circuit required a more local review, however, the emission 
impacts most certainly would have been larger than one percent.155 
                                                        
 148.  See supra Part I.C. 
 149.  It should be noted that the agency at issue in Mayo was not tasked expressly with 
any conservation goals, a significant difference worth pointing out which may have had an 
impact on the emissions analysis. 
 150.  See supra Part I.C.1. 
 151.  See supra text accompanying notes 67–69. 
 152.  See supra Part I.C.2. 
 153.  See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 154.  See Kass, supra note 39, at 60–63 for what she refers to as the “Death-by-a-
Thousand-Puffs” problem of NEPA, created because there are so many sources of GHG 
emissions that each individual source may seem insignificant, but cumulatively creates a 
great problem. 
 155.  By localizing the problem of GHG emissions—as opposed to comparing sources 
nationally—more future GHG sources would meet the threshold significance requirement, 
thereby encouraging more mitigation.  While a planned factory may be a small source of 
GHG emissions nationally (thus failing to meet the significant impact required for an EIS), 
by narrowing the focus locally, the factory’s emissions likely would be sizable, triggering an 
EIS and the benefits that stem from it. 
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Like so many things, the devil is in the details.  Emissions from a 
proposed project will almost always seem insignificant when com-
pared nationally or regionally.  This approach is a bit like the dieter 
who continuously concludes, “what is one more cookie?”  Like Chief 
Judge Wald wrote in her dissent many years ago, are we not missing 
the forest for the trees if we include climate change impacts in an EIS 
and EA, but do so only with a national or regional focus?156  To assess 
accurately the environmental impacts of a project, the emissions im-
pact review should be much more local.157  In this way, the agency is 
better informed of the environmental impacts of the proposal, meet-
ing the purpose of NEPA.158 
Even more troubling about the Eighth Circuit’s ruling is its ac-
ceptance of the agency’s conclusion that the local air quality effects of 
the proposal to deliver coal more quickly and cheaply to the power 
plants were “speculative” and “ultimately unforeseeable.”159  While the 
Eighth Circuit originally stated that “it is almost certainly true—that 
the proposed project will increase the long-term demand for coal and 
any adverse effects that result from burning coal,”160 this searching 
standard seems to have evaporated in the final Mayo opinion in which 
the court accepted the defendants’ argument that the local air quality 
impacts were too difficult to predict and were merely speculative.161  
The court’s ultimate conclusion is a far cry from the first remand.162  
The court essentially adopted the policy that a NEPA review is suffi-
cient when some of the environmental impacts are uncovered, as op-
posed to the comprehensive and proactive approach suggested by the 
Ninth Circuit.163 
The conclusions that can be drawn from these cases are: (1) 
while “remote and speculative” may not be a defense to avoid climate 
change considerations in EISs generally, it is still a defense that is 
raised regarding cumulative effects analyzed nationally or regional-
                                                        
 156.  See supra text accompanying note 75. 
 157.  This solution also avoids the problem Professor Kass dubbed “No-Project-Left-
Behind,” in which every project that increases GHGs requires an EIS, creating significant 
administrative challenges.  Kass, supra note 39, at 66–68. 
 158.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 159.  See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 160.  Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
 161.  See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 162.  See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 163.  See supra Part I.C.1. 
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ly;164 (2) while nominal progress is being made to include climate 
change considerations in NEPA analysis, there is much more progress 
to be made;165 and (3) if, after only two circuits have reviewed climate 
change impacts under NEPA, there is already a lack of uniformity re-
garding the details required to pass an adequacy challenge, then the 
case law in this area is likely to become even more diverse as addition-
al federal courts of appeals review this issue.166 
C.  New York v. NRC and the Opportunity It Poses 
Although the NEPA challenge brought by petitioners against 
NRC did not argue inadequate change analysis, the ruling nonethe-
less sets a new point of reference for NEPA and the “remote and 
speculative” issue.167  This Part of the Comment argues that this new 
reference point should be used in future NEPA challenges (1) to re-
but any remote and speculative justifications for avoiding a NEPA 
analysis of the cumulative climate change impacts of proposals and 
(2) to ensure that the level of detail regarding the climate change im-
pacts is sufficient. 
Although nuclear power and the threats posed by storing spent 
fuel are quite different from those posed by climate change, there are 
significant similarities.  First, the magnitude of potential harm is simi-
lar.  While the harm posed from spent nuclear waste is potentially 
more localized, if one considers the harm climate change is predicted 
to bring globally from severe weather events, droughts, and flooding, 
the overall environmental impacts are just as deadly.168  Second, the 
“uncertainty” of the risk and thus the ability to predict the harm that 
will result is equally difficult.  Scientists disagree, but spent nuclear 
                                                        
 164.  See supra Part I.C.2. 
 165.  See supra Parts II.A–B.  For an in-depth review of the cursory nature of the limited 
EISs containing climate change considerations, see Stein, supra note 130, at 477.  Professor 
Amy L. Stein concluded that historically, ninety-nine percent of EAs result in a FONSI and 
studied every EIS completed by the Bureau of Land Management from 2007–2008.  Id.  Of 
the thirty-five EISs completed in that timeframe, thirteen made no mention of climate 
change, seven only contained stock language on the matter, and only fifteen quantified 
GHG emissions with only three discussing GHG mitigation.  Id. 
 166.  See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 167.  See supra Part I.D. 
 168.  For a discussion on the future impacts of climate change see Caleb W. Christo-
pher, Success by A Thousand Cuts: The Use of Environmental Impact Assessment in Addressing 
Climate Change, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 549, 559–60 (2008). 
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waste may remain radioactive for 10,000 to 1,000,000 years.169  Imag-
ine the difficulties of a NEPA analysis projected that far into the fu-
ture.  While climate change models frequently show the difficulty in 
precisely predicting what climate change impacts will occur where 
and at what moment, one would be hard pressed, when comparing 
the environmental impacts of spent radioactive waste and climate 
change, to claim that the impacts of climate change are less certain.170 
In New York v. NRC, the court determined that the possibility that 
a permanent repository for spent fuel would not be built was a “far 
cry” from the too “remote and speculative” threshold precluding en-
vironmental impact analysis.171  Yet, the likelihood that climate change 
and its predicted impacts will occur is just as likely, if not more like-
ly.172  It would be inconsistent to allow the environmental impacts of 
proposals affecting climate change to go unaddressed, even when lo-
calized and difficult to define with precision, as in the Mayo case,173 
but to insist that the environmental impacts of spent fuel lacking a 
permanent repository must be analyzed.174  The comparison is made 
not to suggest that the environmental impacts of spent fuel should 
                                                        
 169.  Testimony of Robert Meyers, Principal Deputy Assistant Adm’r for the Office of 
Air and Radiation, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Qual-
ity Comm. on Energy and Com., U. S. House of Representatives (July 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/testimony/110_2007_2008/2008_0715_rjm.pdf (ex-
plaining the range in predictions of how long spent nuclear fuel remains radioactive). 
 170.  The most authoritative reports on the future impacts of climate change are from 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  Its most recent comprehensive report 
from 2007 concludes that by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people in Africa will be ex-
posed to increased water stress and the country’s agricultural yield could be reduced by 
50%.  It predicts that coastal areas of Asia, particularly the heavily populated areas, will be 
at great risk of flooding, and endemic morbidity and mortality from disease will rise due to 
floods and droughts.  The analysis continues with specific forecasts for each country.  
North America is expected to have decreased agricultural yields in the south and an in-
crease in yields elsewhere.  Heat waves in cities are expected to increase in number, inten-
sity, and duration with negative health impacts.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 11 
(2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. 
 171.  New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 172.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 170 at 7–8 (dis-
cussing the “high agreement” among scientists that changes to the climate are “very likely” to 
be more significant in the twenty-first century than they were in the twentieth). 
 173.  See supra Part I.C.2. 
 174.  See supra Part I.D. 
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not be accounted for, but rather that increases—and decreases175—in 
GHG emissions have equal environmental impacts and require equal-
ly detailed environmental analysis.176  From this perspective it is rea-
sonable to draw from NEPA case law concerning nuclear impacts to 
inform new NEPA litigation concerning climate impacts.  As such, 
New York v. NRC arms attorneys with a significant reference point to 
rebut the “remote and speculative” defense that continues to surface. 
Next, where courts hold that climate change impacts are re-
quired under NEPA, the case also provides fodder for a thorough 
analysis, including localized effects, as opposed to only the cursory re-
view that characterized Mayo.177  If, under New York v. NRC, the federal 
agency is held to a high standard of NEPA review before changing its 
regulations on the storage of SNF on site for sixty years beyond a 
plant’s licensed life,178 so too should the climate change impacts of 
other federal agencies be equally scrutinized.179 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the role that NEPA will play in curbing U.S. GHG 
emissions is still very much undecided.180  While federal courts of ap-
peals are likely to continue to hold that GHG emissions are appropri-
ate considerations under NEPA,181 when such an analysis is required 
and the standard of review used in determining the adequacy of such 
an analysis remains unknown.182  The Draft Guidance authored by 
CEQ leaves this decision largely to each individual agency.183  The only 
                                                        
 175.  The court in Center for Biological Diversity, for example, considered a case in which a 
federal proposal would decrease emissions.  Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway 
Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 556 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that it was improper to 
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 176.  See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 67. 
 177.  See supra Part I.C.2; see also supra note 165. 
 178.  See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 179.  For an argument against increasing the standard of review of climate change con-
siderations under NEPA, see C. Grady Moore, III et al., Indirect Impacts and Climate Change: 
Assessing NEPA’s Reach, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, at 30, 35 (2009). 
 180.  See supra Parts I.B–C. 
 181.  See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 182.  See supra Part II.B. 
 183.  See supra Part II.A. 
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circuit courts that have dealt with the issue thus far have diverged, fur-
ther highlighting the quandary and the range of opinions that are 
likely to be issued without leadership from CEQ, Congress, or the 
President.184  On the one hand, the Ninth Circuit has acted proactive-
ly185 and has taken its judicial review of EISs seriously, setting prece-
dent that even where a project will reduce GHG emissions, its EIS may 
still be inadequate for failing to consider further reductions.186  The 
Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, has adopted a far more deferential 
standard of review, accepting the assertion that GHG emissions and 
their impacts are too difficult to predict.187  Additionally, it established 
precedent that projects causing a one-percent increase in national 
emissions are insignificant.188  While this conclusion may seem rea-
sonable, it is in stark contrast to the Ninth Circuit precedent that even 
a .02% decrease in emissions is significant.189 
For the environmental lawyer interested in, at the very least, sta-
bilizing U.S. GHG emissions, NEPA is one avenue worthy of pursuit.  
As NEPA’s utility in curbing climate change continues to be deter-
mined through litigation, environmental advocates should turn to 
NEPA case law, beyond climate change, to overcome agency argu-
ments against thorough consideration of GHG impacts in EISs.190  Par-
ticularly, this should be done to overcome the “remote and specula-
tive” defense defendants will predictably raise.191  In overcoming this 
obstacle, the New York v. NRC decision provides environmental advo-
cates with a poignant point of reference.192  The courts have been 
dealing for years with difficult-to-predict, far-off-in-the-future potential 
impacts in the nuclear context, but they have nonetheless settled on a 
searching standard of review.193  As the environmental impacts from 
climate change are equally damaging as the hazards posed by spent 
nuclear fuel, it is appropriate to import the searching standard 
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adopted in New York v. NRC.194  By turning to New York v. NRC, envi-
ronmental advocates can ensure that NEPA plays a meaningful role in 
reducing U.S. emissions. 
 
                                                        
 194.  See supra Part II.C. 
